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IS INTERNATIONAL LAW COERCIVE? 
By Anthony D’Amato∗ 
 
 
 A foundational question in the current revival of interest in international legal 
theory is whether states are coerced to obey the rules of international law. Does fear of 
some kind of physical punishment actually deter states from violating international law? 
If so, what forms could the punishment take? When and how would it be meted out? 
Indeed, how can an entity as big and unwieldy as a state be punished at all? One might 
have thought that such basic questions would have been settled decades ago. Yet 
international law seems to have gotten along quite well without answering them. I say 
“seems” because for all we know a better understanding of how international law works 
might have strengthened its time-honored role of providing rules and reasons that help 
steer interstate disputes away from the battlefield and into the negotiating room.1  
 Most researchers today do not so much shy away from addressing the topic of 
coercion as simply denying its importance. They contend that states obey or disobey 
                                                 
∗ Leighton Professor of Law, Northwestern University.. 
1 Louis Henkin’s famous observation seems to be truer with each passing year: “almost all nations observe 
almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.” Louis 
Henkin, How Nations Behave 47 (2d Ed 1979). It is instructive to compare Henkin’s formula with 
scientific laws. Suppose in stating the law of gravity one says “almost all objects when dropped fall 
downward almost all of the time.” How could this be a “law” at all? Scientific laws do not admit of 
occasional violations, whereas human law is, practically speaking, predicated upon occasional violations: if 
there were no violations of a statute, then there would be no need for the statute. For example, “citizens are 
forbidden to hold their breath for more than five minutes” is an unneeded law because it cannot be violated. 
By contrast, when a human law can be violated, then the state intervenes to stop the violation. 
 1
international norms for a variety of reasons which need not include fear of punishment, 
retaliation, or reprisal. Some even argue that international law is inherently a non-
coercive kind of law. Their views need to be taken seriously. They may be sorted into six 
categories with some overlap between them: dualism, consent, domestication, soft law, 
the New Haven school, and exceptionalism. In this Article, after a brief examination of 
the relation between rules and their enforcement, I criticize each of these categories. My 
overall thesis is that there is no significant difference between international law and 
domestic law with respect to the issue of enforcement. The second half of the Article is a 
defense of this thesis.  
 
I. MUST ALL LAW BE COERCIVE? 
 
 In offering a critique of the six views that international law is not a coercive 
regime, this first Part sets forth 19 analytic propositions. This philosophical technique is 
known as aporetics.2 The propositions in this section and additional ones later on are 
constructed in logical sequence in order to break down and analyze the various 
arguments. They also serve a secondary purpose in providing an easy cut-and-paste way 
of summarizing the main thesis of the Article. 
 
 (1) The irreducible essence of law is that it is a collection of precepts that guide or 
regulate human behavior. 
                                                 
2 . An apory is a group of acceptable seeming propositions that are then tested for their collective 
consistency. See Nicholas Rescher, Paradoxes: Their Roots, Range, and Resolution 7-9 (2001).  
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 (2) There is a possible world in which everyone without deviation obeys all the 
precepts, hence obviating any need for, or threat of, coercion, compulsion, or physical 
punishment.  
 (3) Coercion is not a necessary part of law in all possible worlds. 
 
 The foregoing possible-worlds construct shows that there is nothing incoherent in 
the idea of law without sanctions.3 International law can be complete if it is always 
obeyed; the question of enforcement would simply not come up.  
 It follows that whether international law needs to be enforced is not a 
jurisprudential question about law; rather, it is a question of the inherent nature of homo 
sapiens. It is common knowledge that no society on Earth has lasted more than very 
briefly if it did not enforce its rules.4 There is a simple reason for this: human nature is 
attracted to free riding. The free rider wants the full package of benefits given by society 
but would like a personal exemption from one or more of its rules. Free riding appears 
whenever it is possible to get something for significantly less than it would cost to pay for 
it (for example, benefits from robbery and embezzlement). Free riders are able to 
convince themselves that only clueless folks internalize and obey norms like morality, 
justice, fairness, civic virtue, doing one’s share, helping a neighbor in need, serving in the 
military, and respecting the human rights of others when no one is watching.  
 Free riding tends to be contagious; if left unchecked it can spread rapidly through 
a population as people increasingly become addicted to doing as little as they can get 
                                                 
3 Strictly speaking, if a proposition is not true in all possible worlds, then it is not deductively true. Instead, 
its truth is a contingent fact of the particular world one has chosen to talk about. 
4 Included are utopian societies, all of which eventually founder on their inability, in the absence of 
enforcement mechanisms, to prevent free riding. 
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away with. Eventually society may break down. This possibility is so evident that 
societies from the earliest hunter-gatherer groups to the complex nations of today have 
used their monopoly of power to fight all forms of free riding.5 Societies can impose 
virtually limitless costs upon would-be free riders. These costs are called punishments; 
they include deprivations of life, health, freedom, and property.6 A free rider by 
definition will not be deterred by norms, rules, and principles standing alone. He or she 
will only be deterred if society attaches a punishment to the violation of rules—a 
punishment that exceeds whatever benefits the free rider might derive by the violation. 
More precisely, a rational free rider is deterred if the probability of punishment times its 
severity exceeds the probability of getting away with the crime times the monetary value 
of the crime. Accordingly, we might say that phrases such as “law without sanctions” or 
“rules without penalties” are oxymoronic in the possible world we inhabit whenever the 
subject is the regulation of conduct by precepts—that is, whenever the subject is “law.”7  
 Nothing that has been said so far would suggest that we should distinguish 
between international law and domestic law. Nations are quick to seek free-riding 
opportunities.8 Whether the subjects of the law are states or people, our experience in the 
                                                 
5 See Elliott Sober & David Sloan Wilson, Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish 
Behavior 132-158 (1998). 
6 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State 18 (1949). 
7 Why not substitute some other word for “law” and thus finesse the question whether international law is 
really “law”? In a great and underrated treatise, The Principles of International Law (1st ed. 1895), T.J. 
Lawrence cautions us not to read too much into the word “law.” The term “international law”, he writes, is 
useful for at least three reasons: (1) “whatever precepts regulate conduct are laws.” Id. at § 12. (2) States 
and scholars regularly use the term “international law” in diplomatic discourse. Id. (3) The term usefully 
separates legal rules from other normative injunctions such as international morality and international 
comity. Id. at § 10. In any event, if we invented a word to replace “law,” such as “Nomox,” the issue 
examined in the present Article would not go away. It would still be important to know whether 
international nomox is precatory or coercive. 
8 Belgium’s declared neutrality in 1940 can count as a major example of free-riding. Belgium expected 
France and Great Britain to protect her against Germany. But even if they had, Belgium’s future on the 
doorstep of a racially insane fascist power was clearly foreseeable in 1940 as being intolerable.  
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real world teaches us the unassailable fact that, to be effective, law must be enforced by 
physical sanctions. Thus:  
 
 (4) Although law is not inherently coercive, it is contingently coercive in all 
human societies including the international community of states. 
 (5) When the term “inherently coercive” is used, it is herein intended as a 
pragmatic truism about law in human societies. 
  




 (6) The theory of dualism claims that every state is sovereign. Thus no state is 
subject to a higher law. 
 (7) Under dualism, international law, whatever it may mean, cannot coerce the 
sovereign states. 
 (8) Rules of international law are not binding upon states because states are not 
bound by any external law.  
 (9) Every state promulgates and enforces laws that apply exclusively within its 
territory.9  
 (10) No state’s law extends into the territory of another state. No state is 
sovereign over part or all of any other state. 
                                                 
9 This is called the state’s internal law, or its domestic law, or its municipal law. The state’s internal law 
includes the Constitution, statutes, administrative regulations, and judicial decisions. 
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 (11) There are well-known rules of customary international practices, 
misleadingly called international law and correctly called comity, that states usually 
observe on a voluntary basis. 
 
 Propositions (6) through (11) spell out the theory of dualism. Advocates of this 
theory assume that there are two non-overlapping spheres of legal interest, the domestic 
and the international. Domestic law and international law are each sovereign in their own 
spheres. The objects of domestic law are people; the objects of international law are 
states.10 This characterization has a certain tidy elegance which however breaks down as 
soon as one asks what happens in cases where domestic law and international law clash 
with each other. The dualists invariably give the same answer: domestic sovereignty 
prevails. In other words, international law is inferior to domestic law.  
 Monism is the opposite of dualism. It says that when domestic law clashes with 
international law, international law takes precedence. Clearly monism and dualism cannot 
co-exist.11 At first glance monism seems superior to dualism because it accounts for the 
existence of international law in the ordinary and full sense of the word “law.” To be 
sure, if it could be shown that international law cannot be enforced against states, then 
dualism will have validated itself. Hence the present critique of dualism must remain 
incomplete until a showing is made, in the second part of this Article, that international 
law is physically enforceable against states. Only then can the theory of dualism be 
falsified. 
                                                 
10 Dualism holds that states are the objects of international law but are not subject to its rules. 
11 More than a few professors of international law have told me informally that they begin their courses 
with a demonstration that monism is the only theory that is logical and makes sense, and then go on to 
teach the remainder of the course from a dualistic perspective. When I inquire how they reconcile the two 
approaches, they reply that they do not reconcile them. 
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B. Consent     
 
 From time to time a state will announce that although it believes international law 
is dualistic, it will always obey any international norm to which it has expressly 
consented. During the Cold War, for instance, the Soviet Union denied the existence of 
customary international law but asserted on many occasions that it would adhere strictly 
to all its treaties and agreements with other states. What about treaties entered into prior 
to 1917? These old Tsarist treaties, the USSR said, were “unequal” treaties and hence did 
not need to be honored. However, the Soviet Union did in fact honor them (with the 
exception of its repudiation of railway and commercial development bonds issued by the 
Tsars).  
 Nevertheless there is a fatal flaw in the consent theory. Suppose that N is a norm 
in both a dualist world and a monist world. The two worlds are exactly the same in every 
respect except for their different attitudes toward dualism and monism. Any example of 
N will suffice for present purposes. Suppose N is the norm entitling every coastal state to 
a 200-mile exclusive economic zone (N = EEZ). We further assume that D is a state in 
the dualist world, and M is a state in the monist world. Both D and M decide to repudiate 
rule N. They do this by having their ships fish in the EEZ waters of other states. 
 The stage is now set for us to examine the reaction of other states to the actions of 
D and M. In the Dualist World, other states may reduce their trade with D because D is a 
promise-breaker. At international conferences they might shun the representatives of D as 
untrustworthy. There is no doubt that D has suffered reputational damage. The 
 7
government of D is likely to respond by issuing a press release stating that its EEZ 
decision was a one-time event, that D has a right to change its mind, that its EEZ decision 
was vital to its national security, that D’s nationals have a human right not to starve to 
death, that D has no plans for repudiating any other agreements, and that D apologizes to 
other nations if its action has caused them any real discomfort. Note that all the foregoing 
positions are at least minimally credible because D has violated no law in breaking its 
promise, for there is no law to violate.12 D or any other state in the Dualist World may 
enter into commitments and then break them with impunity, for there is no international 
law that would compel them to keep promises once made. In order for treaties (or private 
contracts for that matter) to be binding, there must be a higher law external to the treaty 
that makes the promises contained in the treaty binding. This bindingness in international 
law is called pacta sunt servanda. Hence: 
 
 (12) All treaties implicitly, and some explicitly, proclaim that they are binding. 
However, a breach of the treaty automatically entails a breach of the bindingness 
provision. Hence a rule that a given treaty is binding can only be found, if at all, external 
to the treaty. 
 
 Entirely different are the consequences in the Monist World. Although the 
underlying facts are exactly parallel, the theories of international law in the minds of state 
                                                 
12 The writers who, from time to time, have asserted that all of international law is grounded in state 
consent, then have to explain what happens if a state that wishes to violate a rule of international law 
simply withdraws its consent to that rule right before violating it. This procedure would seem to vitiate all 
the rules, since they are all (by definition) based upon consent. Most of the writers who defend the consent 
principle go on to say that consent once given cannot be withdrawn. But they do not explain why. They do 
not explain where the no-withdrawal rule comes from. Since there is no overarching rule of international 
law in the dualist system like pacta sunt servanda, states are surely as free to withdraw their consent as 
they were in giving consent in the first place.  
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officials, diplomats, and legal scholars, and accepted by them in everyday practice, are 
quite the opposite. If M threatens to disregard the EEZ, other states will be impelled to 
react not by just criticizing M but by using force to prevent M from fishing in other 
states’ exclusive economic zones.13 States will be justified in using force for three 
reasons: to prevent overfishing by M, to punish Spain for violating a treaty provision, and 
to reinforce the entire fabric of rules of international law by preventing any one of them 
from unraveling.  
 
 (13) Because international law in a Monist world is enforceable, it must be 
enforced. Failure to enforce a rule tends to weaken it and to degrade international law 
generally.   
  
C. Domestication  
 
 The domestication theory of international law is a pragmatic attempt to accord a 
kind of enforcement to international rules while leaving intact the dualist theory that each 
state is sovereign over international law. Enforcement coming from domestication does 
not emanate from other states but rather is home-grown. A rule of international law is 
domesticated when a state incorporates it and weaves it into its own domestic legislation 
and rule-making procedures. When that happens, the government will find it harder to 
violate that rule of international law because there will be official and bureaucratic 
                                                 
13 Compare Canada’s deployment of its navy to prevent Spanish ships from fishing just outside Canada’s 
EEZ. Canada’s justification is that migratory fish, that are protected within the EEZ for conservationist 
reasons, often swim beyond the EEZ. Spain argues that it has no obligation to respect Canada’s 
conservation regimes if the fish are physically in the high seas.  
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resistance where the rule has settled in internally. By way of analogy, consider an empty 
cargo ship on the high seas that is able to reverse its course by 180° in one hour. But if 
loaded with cargo, the same ship would require five hours to make the turn due to the 
five-fold increase in weight. Domestication increases the inertia of international rules by 
adding them to dualism’s only available enforcement mechanism—the individual state. 
 There is no doubt that domestication represents progressive development in the 
path toward world order based upon the rule of law.14 But it cannot be a logical substitute 
for coercion. A state wishing to violate a rule of international law may do so at the cost of 
some inconvenience at home. First, it can ignore the domesticated versions of the rule it 
wishes to violate. Second, it can enact legislation overriding the domesticated 
incorporations of international rules. Third, it can (perhaps laboriously) rescind the 
relevant domesticated versions of the international rules prior to taking action on the 
international front.15 Naturally any state that can violate an international rule without 
suffering international consequences by merely making adjustments in its internal law 
cannot be said to be subject to, or bound by, the international rule. 
 
 (14) Because international law in a Dualist world is unenforceable, there are 
theoretically no adverse consequences in failing to enforce it.  
 
 
                                                 
14 Domestication is the recurrent theory of America’s best-selling casebook on international law. See Barry 
E. Carter, Phillip R. Trimble, & Curtis A. Bradley, International Law (4th ed. 2005). 
15 In a spirited defense of domestication, Philip Trimble predicts that it will “alleviate the perennial 
difficulties in explaining whether international law is ‘really law’ and why it is binding. It would 
accomplish this final advantage by simply abolishing the question.” Phillip R. Trimble, The 
“Domestication” of International Law, in International Law Anthology 400, 408, at 401 (Anthony 
D’Amato, ed. 1994) (italics added). 
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D. Soft law 
  
 Soft law is a strategy for formalizing directives or agreements that depend for 
their adherence upon good will rather than physical enforcement.16 Soft law is a kind of 
rule without bite, an agreement with no consequences for its breach other than negative 
reputational effect. The strategy of soft law appears to be working fairly well: think of the 
Helsinki accords (East-West political relations) and the Basle resolutions (global 
banking). Most observers seem to think that disembodied norms are good things to have 
around.17 Soft law can signal the future direction for a norm that may someday may find 
a body all its own. 
 Soft law sensu stricto would not appear to affect the thesis of this Article in any 
interesting way. However, various dualist scholars who have been intrigued by the notion 
of soft law have taken it into a new direction. By combining soft law with dualism, many 
European scholars, for example, write as if soft law for most practical purposes has 
replaced international law.18 This is not wholly remarkable since to them, as dualists, 
international law is not binding. Other writers suggest that soft law can lead us to a higher 
level of development in the area of human rights. It certainly seems true that when writers 
quote soft-law norms, they usually cite norms that promote human rights. Soft-law norms 
seem to have acquired a reputation for humanitarian content. 
                                                 
16 For a concise overview, see Dinah Shelton, Soft Law, in Handbook of International Law, downloadable 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1003387. 
17 Not so Prosper Weil, who prominently called attention to soft law and debunked it at the same time. See 
his Towards Relative Normativity in International Law, 77 AJIL 413 (1983).   
18 See, e.g., Hartmut Hillgenberg, A Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10 EJIL 499 (1999); Ole Spiermann, 
Twentieth Century Internationalism in Law, 18 EJIL 785 (2007); Armin von Bogdandy, The European 
Union as Situation, Executive, and Promoter of the International Law of Cultural Diversity—Elements of a 
Beautiful Friendship, 19 EJIL 241 (2008). 
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 Yet there is a downside. The ease of articulating norms can lead to a flood of 
norms coming from enemies of human rights. A billion Muslims could be generating 
counter-norms such as “women are inferior to men,” “a man’s testimony in court counts 
twice that of a woman’s,’ “a husband may beat his wife,” and “no woman may travel 
without her father’s or husband’s consent.” Suddenly soft law may not look quite so 
benign. Moreover, occasional judicial decisions will cite soft law as if it constitutes 
binding precedent. The ill-advised opinions by the ICJ in Nicaragua v. United States19 
have encouraged many non-governmental organizations to proclaim all kinds of soft-law 
norms as if merely pronouncing them gives them life. The more that writers talk about 
soft law, the more it seems to be invested with a kind of elan vital it neither possesses nor 
deserves.  
 However, advocates of soft law do not want to be left holding an array of 
disembodied norms. Encouraged by the loosely worded opinion in the Nicaragua case,20 
the idea seems to be taking hold that soft law may have found an environmental niche by 
providing content for the hitherto elusive element of opinio juris in the formation of 
customary law.  
 In 1971 I argued that opinio juris was impossible to pin down.21 So far I have not 
seen any documented case out of the millions of reported interstate transactions where 
opinio juris was actually proved. To be sure there have been many suggestions, including 
my own, for an objective test that could fully substitute for opinio juris. Yet even a 
                                                 
19 1984 ICJ Rep. 392. 
20 I expand on this charge in Anthony D’Amato, Trashing Customary International Law, 81 AJIL 101 
(1987).  
21 See Anthony D’Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law 47-72 (1971).One would have to 
interview state officials as to what they think their state would think, if it could think, about whether it had 
an obligation [legal? moral?] to conform its conduct to a certain pattern of state practice. Not only would 
different officials give different answers, but if the question is of current diplomatic importance to the state, 
then the officials would probably feel it is their duty to be evasive or to lie.  
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perfect objective test would be rejected by the advocates of soft law. For an objective test 
would support the monist position that international law is fully determinable without 
reference to the wishes of the target state (that is, the state against which the law is said to 
apply). 
 Both soft law and opinio juris grow out of the assumed sovereignty of the target 
state.22 In short, so long as opinio juris is required to be subjective, its evidence must be 
found in the target state.23 If soft law is used as a window onto opinio juris, it too must be 
attributed to the target state. In that case, both opinio juris and soft law are subjective. 
Hence, finding a norm of soft law to which the target state subscribes is just as difficult as 
finding opinio juris directly without the intermediate step. Fortunately these complexities 
dissolve if dualism itself, as we shall see, can be falsified.  
 
E. The New Haven School 
 
 The New Haven school is one of the most uncompromising variants of dualism in 
the literature of international law. Rather than denying that law needs to be enforced by 
physical power, the late Myres McDougal and his associates founded the New Haven 
school upon the proposition that physical power is law. That which is enforced is law. All 
other norms can be disregarded; they are nothing but paper-and-ink norms. Obey the 
sword, for it is mightier than the pen. 
                                                 
22 Indeed one could think of them as partially overlapping with domestication which holds, in effect, that 
the only way states will be coerced to comply with international law is for the coercion to come from 
within.  
23 The target state is also the source of the exceptionalist position known as the persistent objector. 
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 These ideas originated with John Austin, a nineteenth-century British positivist.24 
Austin held that law was nothing more nor less than a command—a top-down order from 
a commander to his subordinates. The commander’s only qualification for the title is that 
he holds the reins of power. In Austin’s words: 
 
  The matter of jurisprudence is positive law; law, simply and 
  strictly so called; or law set by political superiors to political 
  inferiors.25  
 
It was McDougal’s great insight—or error, as the case may be—to apply the Austinian 
vision to international law. McDougal’s renowned protégé, W. Michael Reisman, stated 
in words that invite comparison with those of Austin quoted above: 
   
  The notion of law as a body of rules, existing independently of decision-  
  makers and unchanged by their actions, is a necessary part of the   
  intellectual and ideological equipment of the political inferior.26 
 
 Of all the bodies of law that McDougal could have chosen as exemplifying 
Austin’s command theory, international law was the most ill-fitting. There is practically 
no evidence that states obey international law because a big power is threatening to 
punish them if they disobey.27 Or to put it more precisely, smaller states may, if 
necessary, make a show of bending their acts and policies to the demands of a 
superpower, but they will hardly regard those demands as constituting the law. They will 
                                                 
24 Austin, of course, did not write on a clean slate. Paving the way for his ultra-realism were Marsilius, 
Bodin, Hobbes, Machiavelli, and Bentham, among others. 
25 John Austin, the Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832), excerpted in Anthony D’Amato, Analytic 
Jurisprudence Anthology 40 (1996). 
26 W. Michael Reisman, The View from the New Haven School of International Law, 86 ASIL 
PROCEEDINGS 118 (1992). 
27 If anything, it is the big powers (the former Soviet Union, the United States under President George W. 
Bush) who keep complaining that the smaller powers use international law to gang up on them. 
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hardly feel “bound” by those demands. To the contrary, they will strive to engage in just 
enough passive resistance as to require the superpower to expend more energy or 
resources (such as bribery in the form of foreign aid) in enforcing its unwanted rules than 
the rules are worth.28 
 However, experience tells us that the bona fide rules of international law enjoy a 
widespread acceptance simply because they coincide with the interests of the aggregate 
of states. (If they did not coincide with aggregate interests, they would never have 
become international rules in the first place.) These aggregate interests include treating 
each state equally under the law and upholding the idea of reciprocity. By taking the 
opposite position in claiming that stronger powers are more equal under the law than 
weaker powers, the New Haven school is making a singularly unpersuasive claim. Thus 
the jurisprudential destiny of the New Haven school may be its eventual irrelevance.29 Its 
founders were great and provocative teachers, but what they taught was a theory of 
inequality that was as true for power as it was false for law. 
      
F. Exceptionalism  
 
 As a theoretical spin-off from the New Haven school; the shelf life of 
exceptionalism might be mercifully brief. The difference is that the New Haven school 
                                                 
28 Defenders of the New Haven school tend to use code words like “authority” and “control” instead of 
more off-putting terms like “power” and “brute force.” The late Professor McDougal summed up 
international law as “the comprehensive process of authoritative decision.” Myres M. McDougal, A 
Footnote, 57 AJIL 383 (1963). These circumlocutions strike me as deliberately ambiguating between power 
and law. 
29 I hasten to acknowledge that mine is far from the prevailing view. For example, Oona Hathaway praises 
the emphasis on power as “transforming the study of international law not just in New Haven but, 
eventually, around the country, and even the globe.” Oona A. Hathaway, The Continuing Influence of the 
New Haven School, 32 Yale JIL 565 (2007). 
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teaches that the strongest states make the law while exceptionalism holds that the 
strongest states are exempt from the law.   
 As we saw in the case of the New Haven school, it is hard to imagine a weak state 
deferring to a stronger state just because the latter claims that its superior military power 
gives it extra legal privileges. In the 1950s, for example, the United States as a 
superpower insisted on a 3-mile territorial sea. Three comparatively weak powers, Chile, 
Peru, and Ecuador in the Santiago Declaration of 1952 claimed a 200 mile territorial 
sea.30 This and thousands of similar examples show that weaker states are more than 
willing to defy the legal claims of stronger states. This empirical observation in fact is 
based upon objective probability theory. Since international law embodies the interests of 
the aggregate of states, the probability in the foreseeable future is very high that weaker 
states will far outnumber stronger states. Thus, whatever the content of the emerging 
international law, the weaker states are more likely to be “closer” to that content than the 
stronger states. By the same token, weaker states tend to see international law as their 
protector, whereas stronger states view the law more like an obstacle.   
 It makes hardly any sense for a strong state to assume that weaker states will 
accord to it exceptionalism. If a schoolyard bully issues rules for all the children to 
follow, they might follow the rules as long as the bully is watching, but behind his back 
they will do everything they can to subvert those rules. The concept is that simple, but it 
seems to have eluded the Bush Administration in its first few years in office. President 
Bush at that time took a strong exceptionalist position in rejecting the International 
Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol, the applicability of the Geneva Conventions and the 
                                                 
30 Later they enforced these claims against American tuna clippers, practically daring the United States to 
fight back. Instead, the US Congress enacted legislation reimbursing owners of tuna clippers for the value 
of their confiscated catch.  
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Torture Convention, and multilateralism in general. Toward the end of his 
Administration, after traveling abroad, President Bush reported that foreign countries 
were not holding the United States in the highest esteem.31  
 Closely related to the doctrine of exceptionalism is Michael Glennon’s 
contention: 
 
 The needs of the powerful are different from the needs of the 
 weak; the powerful don’t need to be concerned about penalties for violation that 
 might dissuade the weak. Obligation is therefore a function of power and 
 influence. A rule that “obliges” the weak may not oblige the powerful ― even 
 though the powerful may miscalculate and flout that rule to their peril. 
 That, in a nutshell, is how legal obligation emerges and also how legal 
 obligation fades: . . . . Norms pervade the international 
 system and provide constant incentives and disincentives for compliance. When 
 norms generate a sufficient measure of compliance, we call them “law.”32 
 
Suppose Professor Glennon is advising the United States on narcotics control. Would he 
contend that the United States Navy has a right to stop and search for narcotics any vessel 
anywhere on the high seas? Would he further say that the United States could either sink 
or seize the vessel if it had narcotics on board? To be sure, he would add that the United 
States might have to pay damages to the owners of the vessel for destruction of their 
property. But the United States can easily afford it. Indeed, when the owners of the vessel 
show up with proof of ownership to collect the damages, they could be arrested for 
trafficking in narcotics. According to Professor Glennon’s argument above quoted, the 
rule of freedom of the seas that “obliges” the weak may not oblige the powerful. The very 
idea of “obligation” is different for rich states than poor states, he contends.  
                                                 
31 See David Scheffer et al., The End of Exceptionalism in War Crimes, 16 ILSA 16 (2007). 
32 Michael J. Glennon, Force and the Settlement of Political Disputes: Debate with Alain Pellet 1, 3, SSRN-
id 10092212.pdf (2008). 
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 Would other states readily accept Professor Glennon’s argument? Would they be 
willing to let the United States take the lead in eroding the rule of freedom of the seas? Or 
is Professor Glennon simply pouring the wine of exceptionalism into a new bottle labeled 
“obligation.”? 
 The following propositions are now offered as an interim conclusion to Part II of 
this Article:  
 
 (15) International law consists of bottom-up rules: the rules that the aggregate of 
states are willing to obey because they serve their collective interest in reducing 
international tensions to promote stability as well as facilitating international trade. 
 (16) These rules come from—i.e., are inductive derivations from—the active 
participation of some states in resolving a controversy and the acquiescence of the 
onlooking states in accepting the resolution that is reached. 
 (17) It is improbable that any state, even a superpower, would have the wisdom 
and self-restraint to articulate rules that would all be systemically stabilizing. For that 
basic reason, among others, no state has ever achieved leadership in international law-
making. 
 (18) It is improbable that any one state, even a superpower, would enhance the 
interests of the aggregate of states if it alone were privileged to disobey rules of 
international law whenever it decided that disobedience was in its own national interest.  
 (19) The fact that the rules of international law serve the interests of the aggregate 
of states does not mean that individual states, in the short run, will not be tempted to 
violate particular rules when they find doing so to be in their national interest. 
 18
 III. INTERNATIONAL LAW IS A COERCIVE ORDER33 
 
An Easy Instance of Enforcement 
 
 In this Part, the inherent coerciveness of international law will be exhibited. Let 
us start with an analogy to bilateral treaties. In such a treaty, state A and state B may 
enforce its provisions against each other. We first take note of the fact that although each 
treaty provision applies equally to both sides, invariably there are some provisions which 
benefit one side more than the other. Since this treaty, like all treaties, was negotiated as a 
package deal, each side received its fair share of these lopsided provisions. Accordingly 
in the particular treaty we are examining, two important provisions are Article P: 
nationals of either party may invest in the other party’s corporations, and Article Q: 
fugitives and insurrectionists of one party who escape into the territory of the other party 
must be captured and returned. Let us consider this situation as if international law does 
not exist. We are only interested, for the moment, in the strategies of A and B. .  
 For background, let A be a wealthy post-industrial state and B a developing nation 
with abundant natural resources and political turmoil. A’s nationals have been buying up 
shares in B’s exploration and mining corporations. B’s government is beset by guerrilla 
and terrorist forces that want to take it over and establish a new regime. Many of these 
forces when pursued by B’s police have crossed the border into A to hide in the jungle 
                                                 
33 This subtitle is a direct homage to Kelsen’s statement: “[L]aw is a coercive order.” Hans Kelsen, General 
Theory of Law and State 19 (1949).  
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areas. Nevertheless, pursuant to the treaty, A has spent some of its resources in capturing 
some of the insurrectionists and remitting them to B. 
 Now let us posit a breach of treaty. B decides that its natural resources are in 
danger of ending up in the hands of foreigners. It enacts a statute imposing a 500% tax on 
all purchases of stock in B’s corporations, the tax to be waived if the purchaser is a 
national of B. Immediately A’s nationals cease to purchase stock in B’s corporations 
because of the confiscatory tax. The government of A protests the tax but B does not 
revoke it. What are A’s remedies? 
  
 (20) If a party to a bilateral treaty commits a material breach,34 the other party’s 
remedies flow from the concept of equality that underlies the treaty. 
` (21) The most obvious remedy available to the non-breaching party is to abrogate 
the treaty. This abrogation would restore both sides to their original position of equality. 
 (22) Another remedy available to the non-breaching party is to enact legislation 
copying the other side’s breach and then applying the legislation to the other side. This 
strategy employs the idea of reciprocity (which is itself one way of achieving equality). 
This strategy (with or without the implementing legislation) may be called tit-for-tat. It is 
also called reprisals in kind.  
 (23) A third remedy available to the non-breaching party is to abrogate a different 
treaty provision. (It will most likely choose to abrogate the provision that the other side 
values most highly.) This strategy follows from principle (21): if a party has the right to 
                                                 
34 A provision is material if it implicates the nature and purpose of the treaty. 
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abrogate the entire treaty, it also has the lesser right to abrogate any part of the treaty.35 
This strategy may be called tit-for-a-different-tat.36 
 
 Thus we see that A has three types of sanction available against B: 
 
 (i) The proposition (21) sanction. In the posited case, A does not want to revoke 
the treaty in its entirety because it contains many provisions that benefit A.  
 (ii) The proposition (22) sanction. Article P, the “reciprocal” abrogation, is too 
weak to be productive in this hypothetical case. For A has the vast majority of investors 
in B’s corporations, whereas only a few of B’s nationals are investing in A’s 
corporations. If A’s remedy is to cut off the latter group, it will hardly make a dent in B’s 
policies. 
 (iii) The proposition (23) sanction. This leaves A with the remedy suggested in 
proposition (23). If A, in retaliation for B’s act, abrogates provision N, then B is very 
likely to back down. The government of B cannot afford to let A be a safe haven for 
insurrectionists. Consequently B may rescind its 500% tax.  
 The argument so far suggests a few critical questions: 
 1. If the preceding hypothetical case is a standard instance of the way 
international law is enforced, why are there hardly any reported cases similar to it? 
The reason for the paucity of cases is that there are international lawyers giving advice to 
                                                 
35 Principles (21), (22), and (23) are part of international law. See Article 60, The Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, 8 ILM 679 (1969). 
36 I invented this awkward term over twenty years ago, and it hasn’t caught on. See Anthony D’Amato, Is 






states A and B. If the head of state of B asks these lawyers whether they see any 
international-law impediment to a statute that would impose a 500% excise tax on foreign 
purchases of stock, the attorneys can be expected to reply that, first, such a statute would 
violate Article P of the treaty with A, and second, A will undoubtedly retaliate by ceasing 
to apprehend and remit insurrectionists who are hiding in A. Fortified now with this 
advice, B’s head of state may see that it is cost-ineffective to enact the excise tax. Hence 
the reported cases on international law will be eloquent by their absence of cases like this 
one. However, a rare case can sometimes come up. We will see below a case like this A-
B hypothetical, the US-France Aviation Case.  
 2. But there must be many minor instances of reprisals. Why aren’t they 
reported in the media? The connection between delict and retaliation is usually 
suppressed by the governments involved. For example, a high official of state S flying 
into New York to attend an important meeting was recently detained by the police upon 
his arrival at Kennedy Airport. They said he matched a number of identification points on 
their computer’s databank of suspected terrorists. He protested vehemently, but to no 
avail. He was released a day later, having missed his meeting. The police apologized to 
him, saying there was a computer error. However, a week earlier, an American 
businessman nearing the completion of a construction contract in state S was told that it 
would be good public relations if he were to assign 5% of the equity in his business to a 
member of the royal family. The businessman refused. That evening he was arrested in 
his hotel room, taken to the police station, abused and beaten and kept in unsanitary 
conditions overnight. His briefcase and laptop were taken away. He was taken to the 
airport with just one credit card to purchase a flight out of the country. He did not contact 
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the media, and as a result his story was received only a brief mention in a foreign 
newspaper. However, the connection between the two stories was certainly obvious to the 
government of S. There was no point in the United States insulting or aggravating the 
government of S by publicizing the reprisal. Yet the two stories, taken together, form a 
classic incident of delict-plus-reprisal that taken alone would be baffling.37 
 3. Is the A-B hypothetical dependent upon there being at least several 
provisions in the bilateral treaty? Yes. Suppose an A-B bilateral treaty had only one 
provision, Article P. Then if B abrogates it and A wants to punish or deter the abrogation, 
A has only two choices: propositions (21) and (22). It does not have the choice of 
proposition (23) because the treaty only contains one proposition. Yet proposition (23) is 
the only one that would be effective in these circumstances. It follows that one-issue 
treaties are unstable. Treaties become more likely to be self-enforcing the more 
provisions they contain.38  
 4. Does the example of the A-B bilateral treaty beg the question because it 
presupposes the existence of international law? No. The strategies by A and B work in 
the absence of international law. The importance of this point will be seen in the 




                                                 
37 The delict in the case of the American businessman is “denial of justice” under international law. 
38 Consider the rocky history of the bilateral Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. It lasted, with great controversy, 
from 1972 to 2002 when the United States, after giving the required notice of consent, unilaterally 
withdrew from the treaty. Although containing much peripheral language, that treaty was essentially a one-
issue treaty and hence, under the formulation above, was inherently unstable. Its instability showed up as 
soon as one party desired to violate it. 
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Expanding the Easy Case  
 
 All of international law can be looked upon as a giant debenture with attached 
coupons for each individual state. (Coupons are non-detachable; once a state is part of 
international law it cannot get out.) The bond pledges the parties to the mutual 
observance of all the rules of international law. If one state—call it state B—violates a 
rule, all the other states (call them “Aggregate A”) will experience a diminution of the 
integrity of the rule that has been violated as well as a lessening of the cohesiveness of 
the entire set of rules.39 In other words, the value of the debenture will diminish. Thus 
Aggregate A has a right under international law to punish or assist in punishing state B 
for its rule-violation.40  
 
 (24) If state E violates a rule of international law and in the process adversely 
affects F’s material interests, F is privileged under international law to violate the same 
rule or a different rule of equal importance that materially affects E’s interests. F’s action 
has variously been called a retaliation, a reciprocal violation, a countermeasure, and a 
reprisal. Kelsen used the term “reprisal,”41 which is perhaps the most exact. If E has only 
violated a practice of international comity, and if F’s retaliation itself falls short of 
violating a rule of international law, F’s response is called a retorsion. 
                                                 
39 Since state A is also a member of the aggregate of states, it too must experience a diminution in the 
integrity of the very rule that it is violating. However, we may assume that A conducted a cost-benefit 
analysis that showed that violating the rule was worth its diminution.  
40 The term “right” is used deliberately. Aggregate A’s “right” comes from aggregate A itself. There is no 
international law other than the law of the entirety of states. Hence the entirety of states defines the rights 
and obligations of individual states.  
41 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State 57 (1949). 
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 (25) A reprisal is an action under international law that would be illegal standing 
alone but becomes legally privileged when used to deter or punish a delict.42  
 (26) Reprisals are both necessary and sufficient in adding the element of coercion 
that makes international law really “law.” 
  
 Some rules of international law are considered by states to be so important that 
Aggregate A will take forceful action to punish their violation. In 1990 Iraq attacked 
Kuwait in what was clearly a war of conquest in violation of one of the most important 
norms of international law. Saddam Hussein may have had inferior international lawyers 
advising him, or perhaps he did not seek their advice, or maybe they told him only what 
he wanted to hear. Obviously he did not foresee that all the states in the world would act 
to preserve the non-aggression norm he decided to violate. Yet Aggregate A did act; 
states contributed soldiers, weapons, and financing to the United States-led military 
repulsion of Saddam’s army. There was no veto in the Security Council.  
 A norm that is important in a different sense is the rule of diplomatic immunity. 
For although the norm against aggression has frequently been violated over the years, 
Iran in 1978 for the first time in history deliberately violated the rule of diplomatic 
immunity. It placed 52 American diplomatic and consular personnel in Tehran in military 
detention.43 The immediate response that occurred to the government of the United States 
would be to round up and arrest all of Iran’s diplomatic and consular personnel present in 
the United States—a tit-for-tat strategy. However, advisers quickly pointed out that the 
new revolutionary government of Iran probably did not care about the fate of these 
                                                 
42 Hans Kelsen, Law and Peace in International Relations 34 (1948). 
43 The diplomats were first held captive by gangs of “students.” International law was only violated when 
Iran ratified the students’ action by transferring the diplomats to an official detention center. 
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officials since they had all been loyal employees of the previous regime of the Shah. The 
United States might even be doing the Ayatollah’s regime a favor if we rounded up and 
detained all the Shah’s officials in this country. Thus the United States resorted instead to 
the tit-for-a-different-tat strategy. It issued a freeze order to all American banks in the 
United States and their branches abroad, locking all financial assets belonging to Iran—a 
total approximating $13 billion. In addition, the United States easily secured the 
cooperation of the major banks in Europe; they issued a similar freeze. The freezes were 
clearly a violation of Iran’s property rights under international law. Yet because the 
action was taken in reprisal for Iran’s violation of diplomatic immunity, the reprisal was 
justified under international law. Iran was notified that the freeze would only be lifted 
upon the safe return of the hostages.44 In 1980, after detailed negotiations,45 all 52 
hostages were returned unharmed and Iran’s bank accounts were unfrozen. Iran’s actions 
were clearly coerced by the operation of international law. 
 Although Iran’s detention of the American diplomatic personnel directly affected 
just the interests of the United States, aggregate interests were secondarily affected by 
Iran’s insult to the integrity of the fundamental international-law rule of diplomatic 
immunity. Was Iran penalized for this secondary infraction? The reported figures are far 
from clear; my own calculation is that Iran may have been penalized approximately a 
billion dollars for the rule-of-law violation.46  
                                                 
44 It was not clear that the American diplomats were “hostages” as they were described by the media, or 
whether they were being held pending their prosecution as aiders and abettors of the support the United 
States had given to the deposed Shah’s government—a government now regarded by the successful 
revolutionaries as illegal.  
45 For an overview, see Karen A. Feste, Negotiating with Terrorists: The U.S.-Iran Hostage Crisis, SSRN-
id724243,pdf (Feb. 2005).  
46 The total amount frozen was approximately $13 billion. Iran eventually received cash and credits 
amounting to approximately $11 billion plus $800 million interest paid by the United States to Iran. 
However, with ordinary interest rates at 15% at the time, I calculate that Iran may have been underpaid by 
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An important and much clearer case on the question of a secondary penalty for 
rule-of-law violation is the U.S.-France Air Service Award.47 . France had issued a 
regulation prohibiting American intercontinental aircraft that stopped at Heathrow 
Airport to continue their flights into DeGaulle Airport. The United States claimed, and 
France denied, that the French regulation violated the Air Services Agreement of 1946. 
The United States thereupon adopted a countermeasure: it prohibited French 
intercontinental aircraft from landing in Los Angeles, in clear violation of the Air 
Services Agreement. The countermeasure was economically more severe than the 
original delict. An arbitral tribunal held that the French action was a delict but the 
American sanction was not excessive.  
Elisabeth Zoller has argued that if sanction imposes a cost greater than the delict, 
the excess must be considered punitive.48 Yet international law, she claims, does not 
allow one state to punish another for violating its rules. Lori Damrosch, on the other 
hand, has argued that the excess was not punitive but instead was necessary as a deterrent 
against future violations of the treaty.49 For if the sanction is made economically 
equivalent to the delict, then nations would be encouraged to violate rules of international 
law whenever they calculate that they are willing to pay fair price for the violations. 
Professor Damrosch concludes that an extra measure of cost, for the purpose of 
deterrence, may be included—provided it is not unreasonably excessive. 
                                                                                                                                                 
about one billion dollars of the total interest due. The official figures that have been released include 
unspecified set-offs. If Iran was in fact underpaid by about one billion dollars, that amount could be 
understood as a penalty for the rule-of-law violation. 
47 Case Concerning the Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946, Arbitral Award of 9 December 1978, 54 
ILR 304 (1979).  
48 E. Zoller, Peacetime Unilateral Remedies: An Analysis of Countermeasures 72-73, 96-98 (1984). 
49 Lori Fisler Damrosch, Retaliation or Arbitration—or Both? The 1978 United States-France Aviation 
Dispute, 74 AJIL 785 (1980).  
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 There is some support for Professor Zoller’s position in ordinary language. It is 
generally regarded that compensation in excess of the exact dollar amount of damages 
sustained is “punitive.” Professor Zoller also argues persuasively that if all states are 
equal under international law, no state has a right to penalize another state. Yet Professor 
Damrosch’s position allowing extra compensation surely reflects the experience of 
international relations through the centuries that unless penalties are attached to rule 
violations, states would frequently violate the rules depending on their own cost-benefit 
analyses.  
 The two theoretical positions may be reconciled by allowing the imposition of the 
extra penalty as Professor Damrosch urges, but re-characterizing it as a cost instead of a 
penalty. This is not a mere verbal distinction, for there are additional costs besides those 
suffered by the United States. The aggregate of states has suffered an indirect, or 
secondary, damage to their interest in the sanctity of treaties. In the Air Services case this 
may onnly be a slight interest financially for each onlooking state, but when multiplied 
by 191 states50 the total could easily account for the “extra” award given to the United 
States.51  
  The injury to the integrity of the rule that is suffered by the onlooking states is 
usually, insofar as individual states are concerned, substantially less than the damages 
suffered by the state that is directly affected by the delict. Yet these secondary injuries 
themselves form a variable scale. On one end nearly all the damages are suffered by a 
                                                 
50 Given a present total of 192 states, all the onlooking states are equally damaged by their interest in the 
integrity of the rule that has been broken by France. This amounts to 190 states. The total goes to 191 
because the United States is damaged both directly by France and indirectly by France’s secondary 
violation. 
51 Deterrence itself arguably falls into the category of punitive damages. After all, if C commits a crime, he 
was obviously not deterred from committing it. Therefore the deterrence portion of his sentencing must be 
aimed at everyone other than C. To C, the deterrence portion of his sentencing can only be a punitive add-
on.  
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single country. On the other end nearly all damages are suffered by the aggregate of 
states. The Air Services Award and the repulsion of Iraq from Kuwait in 1990 are, 
respectively, examples of these terminal points of the spectrum. Some cases of 
humanitarian intervention are close to the Kuwait end of the spectrum. Clearly genocide 
is one of those cases; it targets everyone. Indeed, the magnitude of the crime is such that 
an onlooking state could be criticized for not intervening. 
 A further word needs to be said about a state’s interest in upholding the integrity 
of a rule of international law—what has been called the “secondary violation” or the 
“rule-of-law violation.” The state’s interest is not just a matter of abstract respect for 
legal rules. International law is not just a set of rules of good conduct. Rather, what is at 
stake is the deepest material interests of the aggregate of states in their mutual 
international relations. For example, the division international law draws between 
airspace and outer space might seem arbitrary to the casual observer. Yet the distinction, 
which gives exclusive jurisdiction and control over the airspace to the territorial state but 
regards the space above the atmosphere as belonging to all states, has become so 
embedded that it is not even questioned. It has become, in fact, definitional. Indeed, part 
of what we now mean by the term “state” includes its vertical jurisdiction and control 
over the atmosphere. This rule is not simply one of convenience or good conduct; it is 
part of a nation’s assets and its national security. Hence if state A challenges B’s right to 
its own airspace, every other nation has an immediate material interest in retaining the 
integrity of the rule, even if most nations do not care about giving B political support by 
forcing A to back down. 
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 (27) A state that commits a delict impairs three categories of interests: (i) the 
interest of the state directly affected by the violation of the rule; (ii) the interest of the 
aggregate of states in the impairment of the rule that is violated; and (iii) the interest of 
the aggregate of states in the cohesiveness of international law as a whole that is lessened 
by the impairment of one of its rules.  
 
Deterring a Superpower  
 
 
 An observation by Alain Pellet raises the following issue:  
 5. Does the operation of reprisals in international law favor the stronger 
states because they can more afford to pay the penalties? Professor Pellet, as 
summarized by Professor Glennon, argued that “the needs of the powerful are different 
from the needs of the weak; the powerful don’t need to be concerned about penalties for 
violation that might dissuade the weak.”52 This argument fails because no minimally 
rational state or person will undertake an action that is cost-ineffective, even if it can 
afford to do so.53 To be sure “costs” can not always be exactly monetized. Iran for 
example, when it held on to the diplomatic hostages for many months, may have placed a 
high value on “bragging rights” in disrupting the Great Satan (the United States) and 
ruining President Carter’s chance for re-election. Let us assume that Iran was willing to 
pay a price of $2 Million for each hostage. This is the average figure paid to the victims 
of the 9/11 World Trade Center disaster.54 Suppose the United States had frozen $104 
                                                 
52 Alain Pellet, The Normative Dilemma: Will and Consent in International Law-Making, 12 Australian 
YBIL 22 (1988-89), quoted in Michael J. Glennon, Force and the Settlement of Political Disputes: Debate 
with Alain Pellet 1, 5, SSRN-id 10092212.pdf (2008).  
53 It would be different if a state had unlimited resources. But there is no such state in our finite world.  
54 Bill Marsh, Putting a Price on the Priceless: One Life, New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/09/weekinreview/09marsh.html?_r=1&oref=slogin. 
 30
Million of Iranian bank accounts until the hostages were returned. It is quite likely that 
Iran would have paid the price, kept the hostages, and put them on trial as enemies of the 
state. Instead, the United States froze $13 Billion of Iran’s financial assets. This 
effectively placed a price of $270 Million on each of the 52 hostages. The Iranian 
government, deciding that the agents of Satan weren’t worth it, returned all of them. 
 6. How can reprisals be levied against a superpower? We should not imagine 
reprisals in the form of dropping bombs on cities or adding biological and chemical 
weapons to dams and storage facilities. This sort of crude reprisal would not likely be 
levied against the United States any more than the United States would do the same thing 
against a lesser power. But the assets and values of the United States are not confined to 
its territory. The United States is vulnerable because of its investments and nationals 
located all over the world are vulnerable. The United States has major financial 
investments in foreign-owned companies. More importantly, at any given time there are 
hundreds of thousands of American citizens either traveling or residing abroad.55 How 
many American nationals must a country threaten to make the United States take notice? 
Just 52 were sufficient in 1978 when Iran arrested that number of American diplomatic 
and consular personnel in Tehran. The United States considered many scenarios of 
                                                 
55 The Census Bureau reports that in 1998 there were over 56,000 Americans traveling abroad (compared 
to 46,000 foreign tourists visiting the United States). Even more striking are the figures of American 
citizens residing abroad as reported by the Bureau of Consular Affairs in 1999. There were 27,600 citizens 
residing in Buenos Aires, 55,500 in Sydney, 250,000 in Toronto, 48,220 in Hong Kong, 75,000 in Paris, 
138,815 in Frankfurt, 45,000 in Tokyo, and 441,680 in Mexico City. Among the smaller countries which 
could become “hot spots,” the Bureau reports 646 American citizens living in Albania, 1,320 in 
Bangladesh, 1,600 in Bosnia, 440 in Congo,2,000 in Cuba, 10,000 in El Salvador, 546 in Gambia, 11,000 
in Haiti, 18,000 in Israel (Tel Aviv), 8,000 in Jordan, and 6,639 in Kuala Lumpur, and those are taken from 
just the first half of the list. To these figures must be added the many thousands of American military 
personnel and their dependents on foreign bases. See 
http://www.pueblo.gsa.gov/cic_text/state/amcit_numbers.html  
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removal of the hostages by force, but all of them were far too risky in terms of possible 
lives lost.  
 
IV. RULES GOVERNING REPRISALS 
 
 Despite the effectiveness of reprisals in holding together, sometimes precariously, 
the interwoven fabric of international law, the lack of scholarly attention to the system of 
reprisals has created a gap in the study of international law. Yet it would not be 
impossible, if scholars wanted to go back over the correspondence in foreign offices¸ to 
find many examples of reprisals threatened or taken. From these examples one could 
reconstruct certain implicit rules that keep the reprisal system contained. (We are safe to 
assume that the system of reprisals has been contained; otherwise the world would have 
experienced a far greater incidence of runaway reprisals escalating into war than we find 
in the historical record.) 
 But even from the paucity of cases certain principles can be adduced. These 
principles should not be confused with the self-defense criteria in the famous Caroline 
case: “a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, 
and no moment for deliberation.”56 Even the meanings of the terms are different. The 
principles that constrain the resort to and application of reprisals appear to be the 
following: 
 
 (28) The principle of necessity applies only to the initial decision whether to 
retaliate by using reprisals. It requires the retaliating states if possible to use means that 
                                                 
56 The Caroline Case, Letter of Daniel Webster, The Avalon Project, 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/britain/br-1842d.htm  
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fall short of violaitng rules of international law. Inasmuch as a reprisal requires breaking, 
even if temporarily, one or more rules of international law, obviously Aggregate A would 
prefer getting the offending state to back down without the need to depart from any rules. 
In this respect, the principle of necessity operates to create a presumption in favor of 
punishments that do not require rules to be broken. 
 (29) Related to the principle of necessity is the principle of efficacy. Here again it 
only applies to the initial decision whether to retaliate by using the mechanism of 
reprisals. (It does not monitor the situation following the institution of reprisals.) If a 
particular kind of reprisal would take 100 years to do its work, then the rule of efficacy 
would bar the use of that kind of reprisal in the first place.57 
 (30) One of the most invoked rules of international law governing the scope and 
severity of reprisals is the rule of proportionality.58 Although vague it is far from 
vacuous. If the retaliating nation uses excessive or unreasonable force, other states will 
warn it that it is exceeding the limits of proportionality and must cut back lest the reprisal 
turn into a new delict all its own, inviting retaliation from the other states. 
 (31) As a general rule, multilateral reprisals have priority over unilateral reprisals 
because of every state’s interest in the bindingness of the rules. 
 (32) The principle of relatedness also has presumptive validity. The tit-for-tat 
response (“reprisals in kind”) is the most obvious and hence the most easily justifiable. 
However in some cases it obviously will not work. In the Tehran Hostages case, as we’ve 
                                                 
57 Thus when a multilateral blockade was placed upon Southern Rhodesia in the early 1970s to put 
economic pressure on the state to dismantle its illegal system of apartheid, there were times in the ensuing 
years that the blockade was criticized for being permeable and inefficacious. The blockade may have 
seemed ineffective, but it was not foreseeably ineffective and hence continued to be legal. Eventually the 
reprisal worked and the nations that sponsored it were vindicated. 
58 Although the concept of proportionality can be found in the Caroline case, the word itself was never 
used. 
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seen, the only reprisal that had a chance of working was one that was entirely unrelated in 
subject matter to the violation of diplomatic immunity, namely, the freezing of Iran’s 
bank accounts. 
 
V. CONCLUSION: THE DEEP STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  
 
 At any point in time except during a world war, the nations of the world are in 
legal equilibrium. An encroachment by any state upon the rights of another state or states 
immediately triggers their right of retaliation. The science formula “for every action there 
is an equal and opposite reaction” is applicable.  
 Beneath the surface of the intricate network of rules that keep opposable interests 
at bay is a deep structure that accounts for the persistence and stability of interenational 
law itself. This deep structure does not always reveal itself to researchers and 
practitioners,59 but it would be a mistake to conclude that international law is just a 
fragmented collection of rules. A disconnected group of rules would hardly have survived 
for four thousand years. The fact that international law is in place today without major 
substantive changes in the course of its historical development60 did not happen by 
chance.  
 This Article has shown that an important part of the deep structure of international 
law is its self-referential strategy of employing its own rules to protect its rules. 
International law tolerates a principled departure from its own rules when necessary to 
                                                 
59 Sometimes hiding the reprisal works best, as we saw in the case of the official who was detained in order 
to punish his country’s previous violation of a foreigner’s rights. 
60The two most substantive changes in international law are of recent vintage: the rule outlawing wars of 
conquest, and the infiltration of human rights into the core interests of states.  
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keep other rules from being broken. It extends a legal privilege to states to use coercion 
against any state that has selfishly attempted to transgress its international obligations. 
International law thus protects itself through the opportunistic manipulation of its own 
rules.  
 
 
 
-end- 
